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INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE TESTING
GROUND OF THEORY
Whether law and morality can be separated in the sharp Austinian way
when we consider the nature of international law is the chief question I want
to consider in this essay. 1 There is, of course, rather general agreement that law
contains a moral element. The question, however, is not whether law contains
a moral element "here and there," but whether the very concept of law con-
tains a moral element.
The present evolution of international law affords a good testing ground
for any theoretical account of the nature of law. Certain familiar theories and
definitions of law are plausible when applied to a particular system of law, but
encounter difficulties when considered in the international sphere. These theo-
retical difficulties stem from the ambiguous status of the moral element in the
phenomenon of law. The moral element in law tends to be obscured by a pre-
occupation with (1) economic factors (in Soviet legal theory), (2) the func-
tioning of the courts (in legal realism), and (3) the activity of the sovereign
(in the imperative theory of law). I shall consider each of these theories in
the context of international law.
I. SovIET CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Theoretical Marxist Stage. - The first attempt of the Soviet jurists to
formulate a theory of international law raised difficult problems because the
Marxist principles from which they started did not fit the facts of international
relations. Marxist theory had held that law is the will of the economically domi-
nant class, that it was a weapon of domination, that it was the product of a
state, and that it was the ideological superstructure of a particular arrangement
of the factors of economic production. But not one of these elements was present
in the international scene. At the very beginning, at least, the revolution was
supposed to have destroyed the state - without a state there could be no law,
and without a super-state over all the nations, there could surely be no inter-
national law. Moreover, the nations of the world were not related to each other
in the same way as classes are within a state, and there could be no "will of
the economically dominant class." There was no uniform mode of production
and distribution throughout the world. But without such a uniform economic
structure there would have to be as many legal systems as there are economic
orders which produce them. Even more destructive of the Marxist theory was
1. Some of the loci elassici of the Austinian approach are JOHN AUSTIN, THiE PROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 127 (Hart ed., 1954) and THOMAS HOLLAND, THE
ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 35 (5th ed., 1890). Cf. also AXEL HAOERSTR6M, IN-:
QUIRIES INTO THE NATURE OF LAW AND MORALS 9 (Olivecrona ed., 1953), where he
distinguishes between moral and legal duty: "We may exclude the duties involved in in-
ternational law, since the distinction between them and moral duties is not so definite
as that which holds for duties within a state."
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the fact that international law was a system of rules by which sovereign and
equal nations were attempting to remain sovereign and equal. The law sought
to protect rather than dominate, and to the extent that Soviet Russia was will-
ing to be bound by international law, she sought the protection of her rights,
sovereignty and independence. Finally, as Pashukanis wrote "... if we take
the proposition of Lenin, 'Law is nothing without a mechanism capable of com-
pelling the observance of legal norms,' international law must then be regarded
as nothing... "2
If this failure to account for international law in theory seems to be only
a logical difficulty, it must be remembered that the Soviet jurists, as well as
the leaders of the nation, had from the beginning tried to fashion the closest
bond between Marxist theory and Soviet practice. Had not Pashukanis argued
that "bolshevism requires unswerving logic in political ideas," and that "every-
thing that works to the detriment of logic causes detriment thereby to the cause
of the proletarian revolution, and must be pitilessly anatomized and swept away"?3
It was Mirkine-Guetzevitch who pointed out that "a state involved itself in
contradictions if it claimed to be recognised as a state by others, but interpreted
itself as a mere class-organisation engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the
class-organisations constituted by the other States."4 The only way out of this
contradiction was either to change the theory or take it literally and follow its
logic wherever it led, and in the first phase the Soviet jurists drew the obvious
conclusion that "from the point of view of the Marxian definition of the law,
so-called international law is no law at all." 5
Behind this strictly logical difficulty, Soviet thought represents a fundamental
break in the continuity of the kind of European thought which produced the
broad principles upon which the classical theories of international law had been
built. By its own design Soviet thought declares itself alien to this common fund
of Western ideas which give rise to the structure of international order. It is
for this deeper ideological, and not only logical, reason that Soviet jurists in
this first stage denied the existence of international law. They wished to say
that they did not recognize as in any way binding upon them those rules of
behavior for states which were simply the expression of bourgeois social ideas.
The inevitable involvement of the Soviet Union in the affairs of nations,
stemming most immediately from the need for economic relations with capitalist
states, forced the development of a more realistic attitude concerning international
law.
The Realistic Stage: The Doctrine of Sovereignty and the Use of Treaties. -
This new, realistic attitude is best expressed in the candid words of Korovin:
"It is impossible to reject international law by simply denying its existence and
to dispatch the entire set of international legal norms of the present time [1924]
2. E. B. Pashukanis, The Soviet State and the Revolution in Law, SOVIaET LEGAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 244 (Babb transl., 1951).
3. Id. at 242.
4. Quoted in Rudolf Schlesinger, Recent Developments in Soviet Legal Theory, 6 THE
MODERN LAw RE iEw 21, at 34 n. 49 (1942).
5. 'IANs KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW 150 (1955). Cf. also Stoyanovich,
The Reality of International Law, JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 39 (1959).
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as a bourgeois remainder by a stroke of the pen."6 Korovin injected into Soviet
theory the notion of sovereignty developed by such writers as Jellinek who held
that a state has the power to determine exclusively by its own will the legal
relations under which it will live.
7
The effect of this shift in theory was to say that international law is the
product of agreement between sovereigns as expressed in international treaties.
The Soviet jurists still attempted to retain the earlier distinction between the
material and the formal sources of law. If it was no longer possible to argue
the Marxist theory literally, it could nevertheless be held that the "real founda-
tions" of law among nations must be found in the facts of "struggle, co-existence
and competition." 8 But to explain law in this fashion is to say much more than
that law is the reflex of economic relations, for this new explanation focuses
upon the fact of conflict between peoples as the source of law. The attempt to
resolve these conflicts leads to the formation of legal rules. Thus, international
law becomes the mechanism by which peoples seek to establish order and harmony
rather than an instrument of domination.
At this stage there was still the severe Marxist mistrust, if not outright re-
jection, of "moral laws and the laws of human conscience" 9 as the source of
law or of international obligation. Moral laws, said Troianovski, were too subtle
and lacked precision and could not, therefore, be taken seriously as a basis for
international order. What was needed was "something more positive, more con-
crete and definitive," and this could be found in "very precise international
treaties duly signed" and based on "exact formulas and determined obligations."10
The Idealistic Stage. - In spite of its moral relativism, Soviet thought at-
tempted to find broader sources of law. Thus, in 1940 Kozhevnikov suggested that
custom be recognized as a source.1 1 After World War II, emphasis began to
be placed upon certain "basic principles and concepts" of international law.12
These principles were the criteria for testing the "justice" of acts and treaties.
In 1957 Shurshalov defined these principles as follows:
6. YEVOENI A. KOROVIN, MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO PEREKHODNOGO VREMENI [Interna-
tional Law of the Transitional Period] 2 (1924), quoted in KELSEN, op. cit. supra note
5, at 156.
7. Compare V. M. Shurshalov's insistence that "contemporary international law is basically
treaty law." SHURSHALOV, OSNOVANIIA DEISTVITEL'NOSTI MEZHDUNARODNYKH DOOOVOROV
[Bases of the Validity of International Treaties] 130-31 (1957), quoted in Jan F. Triska
and Robert M. Slusser, Treaties and Other Sources of Order in International Relations:
The Soviet View, 52 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 699, at 717
(1958).
8. Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 724-25.
9. Address of Aleksandr A. Troianovski, 1934 PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 195, at 196 (1934).
10. Ibid. Korovin had expressed rejection of morality as a source of law in clear and
forceful terms when he argued that "the theory of natural law merits rejection not only
for reasons associated with its origin but chiefly because from the Marxist standpoint it
is inconceivable to speak of the existence of any ideal law common to all mankind which
stands above classes." In the same vein, he said that "we must equally reject the argu-
ments of the idealistic school. Neither the moral nature of man as an individual (an ethical
variant) nor his intuitive-legal experiences (the psychological variant) can be considered
a source of international law . .. " KOROvIN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 25-26, quoted in'
Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 702.
11. See treatment of Kozhevnikov in Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 708, 723.
12. SHURSHALOV, as cited in Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 717.
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(1) universal peace and the security of nations; (2) respect for the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of nations which are members of 'the international
community; (3) non-interference in the internal affairs of states; (4) equality
and mutual benefit as between nations; and (5) the rigorous fulfillment of
obligations assumed under treaties - pacta sunt servanda.1
Any treaty which proves to be incompatible with these principles, Shurshalov
argued, is not valid.
As these principles seek ostensibly to channel the conduct of nations along
moral lines, it could be said that Soviet theory on international law has to that
extent moved to a moral basis. With this moral element Marxist and realist
elements continued to coexist so that it would be incorrect to suppose that there
had been a clear progression from one stage of theory to the next. There is a
large admixture of political motives with theory. It must be noted, moreover,
that the terms used by the Soviet writers may not have the content and signifi-
cance of the same terms as used in the West. 1 4 Yet, even with a different con-
tent, heavily charged with political intent, these more general principles and
concepts would seem to reflect an attempt to put international law on a basis
which could be considered "moral," at least in distinction to an international
law resting merely on the will of sovereign states. There is a recognition of cer-
tain basic human desires and aims. If Soviet theory of international law is to be
developed further, it would appear to lead to explicit recognition of the moral
basis of legal obligation. The course of development to date suggests that only
a theory which is neither followed logically nor employed in actual practice can
separate the concerns of law and morals.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
The approach to the law which -emphasizes that it is "what the courts do"
is undoubtedly helpful when one considers the practical intent behind this defini-
tion. But what strikes one about this theory is that it could only have been de-
veloped, as it was by Holmes and Gray and earlier by Bishop Hoadley, in a
highly developed society with a settled judiciary.15 A brief glance at the status
of the World Court, however, quickly indicates that the Court, far from "mak-
ing" law, must look to specifically designated "sources" for the "law" which it
will apply. What we are observing today in the development of the international
court is that the Court can have no power or jurisdiction until the nations of
the world are fully satisfied that it will not be the case that the law is "what
the Court does."1 6 It is precisely the suspicion in many quarters that the Court
may decide cases either in political terms or according to the subjective opinions
of the judges which has hindered the development of international law. The
13. Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 71748 (paraphrasing SHURSHALOV, Op.
cit. supra note 7, at 140-44).
14. Triska and Slusser, op. cit. supra note 7, at 723.
15. Cf. S. E. Stumpf, The Moral Element in Supreme Court Decisions, 6 VANDERBILT
LAw Raviaw 41 (1952).
16. The statute creating the Court attempts as much as possible to create an independent
judicial body and to reduce its political complexion. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. "'*"
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deep conviction which lies behind this suspicion is that the function of a court
must be to administer the law - the court must not be the creator of the law
and thereby usurp the role of the legislature.1 The nations of the world rightly
refuse to accept the notion that law is simply what the courts do, "and nothing
more pretentious."
It is not enough simply to have a court, even one which has a determinate
structure, in order to have law. The United States Supreme Court is effective
not merely because of the rules of its organization, but particularly because in
addition it has available a fairly definite guide to the legal terrain, a creative
articulation of the fundamental law of the land, the Constitution. Moreover,
the formulation of an effective constitution or basic instrument of law must be
more than the pronouncement of an effective sovereign. The weakness of inter-
national law is not due solely to the absence of a superior coercive force, for
the emergence of law is neither the activity of the courts nor the will of power-
ful entities. We are again faced with the problem of discovering how the na-
tions of the world can agree to be bound responsibly to certain rules of behavior.
The Court must not expect to have its jurisdiction established simply through
the development of some superior force to administer sanctions. Indeed, the
whole concept of power as the basis of law becomes untenable when one con-
siders what such a force would have to be to deal effectively with our most
powerful nations; the use of force here would result in nothing less than war -
precisely the condition the law is trying to alleviate. Besides, the concept of power
is incapable of solving the problem of the grounds of obligation. The Court
is ineffective, not because it does not have the backing of sanctioning power, but
because there is no sufficient agreement among the nations upon the rules by
which they should be bound.
17. Judicial caution is an attitude of mind resulting .. . from the fact that courts have
to apply the law and that they have to apply the law in force. They have to apply-
and no more than that-the law. It is not within their province to speculate on the law
or to explore the possibilities of its development .... It is not their function deliberately
to change the law so as to make it conform with their own views of justice and ex-
pediency. This does not mean that they do not in fact shape or even alter the law. But
they do it without admitting it ... The same considerations apply to the administration
of international justice. Moreover, there exist in this sphere additional reasons for the
exercise of restraint. These include, in the first instance, the importance of the subject-
matter on which the courts have to decide. They cannot experiment or innovate as
easily in matters in which States have an interest . . . [Also there is] the fact of the vol-
untary nature of the jurisdiction of international tribunals. An international court which
yields conspicuously to the urge to modify the existing law-even if such action can be
brought within the four corners of a major legal principle-may bring about a drastic
curtailment of its activity. Governments may refuse to submit disputes to it or to renew
obligations of compulsory judicial settlement already in existence. HERSCH LAUTER-
PACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
75-76 (1958).
Cf. his reasons for the use of precedent, at 14:
The Court follows its own decisions for the same reasons for which all courts-whether
bound by the doctrine of precedent or not-do so, namely, because such decisions are a
repository of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because they embody
what the Court has considered in the past to be good law; because respect for decisions
given in the past makes for certainty and stability, which are of the essence of the
orderly administration of justice; and ... because judges are naturally reluctant, in the
absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, to admit that they were previously in
the wrong. (Emphasis added)
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The problem of obligation in international law is fundamentally a moral
one, because it is impossible to separate the question of obligation in law from
the question of obligation in general.1S The Court will become a vital institu-
tion only after the moral sentiment of men has been sufficiently crystallized to
articulate general principles by which men are willing to be :bound in their
conduct and which they propose as the rules of others' conduct as well. The
Court cannot come into being without this broad conviction in the international
community that there are certain principles of right by which controversies are
to be considered and judged. And even where a court is established by common
agreement, as is the World Court, it does not possess the power to proceed with-
out some specification of the rules it will enforce and which will govern its judicial
reasoning. Thus, although the Court renders a final decision, this decision is
not the "source" of the law, except in the sense of being the immediate or
"proximate" source. The sources to which the Court must turn are expressly
listed in the Statute of the Court, and these are the true sources of law in the
field of international law.19
A careful examination of these sources indicates that to a very great extent
they are moral.
The First Source: Treaties. - One class of treaties in particular may be con-
sidered a major source of law; these are the treaties entered into by a substantial
number of nations to declare their understanding of the law on a particular
problem, and, perhaps, to lay down a general rule for future conduct or the
creation of some new institution. These treaties are the closest approximations
to legislation, although even these "law-making" treaties are generally limited
to those nations participating in their creation and are generally not binding
upon those who are not parties to them.2 0 These treaties result in conventional
law, for they are the product of an agreement. But the conventional character
of treaty law does not mean that nations can agree to do just about anything
they want, as though the word "conventional" were construed to mean that
agreements between nations are not subject to moral rules. A first requisite of
a treaty is that it must contemplate a purpose which is defensible in the councils
of the international community.
This source of law, where a case involves a treaty, leaves the least amount
of room for the Court's independent reasoning; for the treaty, not the Court's
decision, is the source of the law.
18. Cf. CHARLzs DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
126-27 (1953).
19. These are set forth in STATUTE OP THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE art. 38:
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules ex-
pressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59 [which provides: "The decision of the
Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular
case"], judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
20. Note that the United Nations Charter binds nations which are not parties to it, "so
far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para. 6.
NATURAL LAW FORUM
The Second Source: Custom. - That custom should be a source of law which
the Court must consider can be explained only on the assumption that the rules
of conduct which custom creates are more in accord with the moral sentiments
of mankind than rules which are simply habitual modes of behavior or the edict
of a sovereign. If the element which differentiates custom from habit is the
conscious recognition that the custom has obligatory force, then a custom is
transformed into a law -by the rational process which ascribes to certain rules
of behavior the attribute of "right" or "just." There are customs, of course,
whose effect is to destroy human freedom, integrity, and self-respect. It could
not, therefore, be argued without serious qualification, that a custom becomes
law through its moral element - not every custom is "moral." Nevertheless,
when a mode of behavior represents more than just a habitual way of acting -
when, that is, people consent to be bound by a rule - then such a custom springs
from the moral consensus of the community. A customary rule which becomes
law is not an eternal or perfect rule, but it frequently exhausts the powers of
rational discernment of right for the time being; and until some higher perspec-
tive is reached, this rule may very well be the fullest expression of right and
justice available. Even the notion of natural law contains this mode of relativism.
The Court thus has available a source of law which lies as close as possible to
those who will be bound by it. When this customary rule is ambiguous, a larger
scope for judicial discretion and interpretation opens up where the judges take
the fragmentary tissues of the custom and weave it into a whole concept.2 1 In
this process, the Court participates with the community in the law-creating pro-
cess, being led by the consensus of the community. The Court is surely engaging
in a creative process here, but the true source of the law is found not in the
Court but in the moral discernments of the community.
The Third Source: General Principles of Law. - Nowhere is the creative
function of the Court made more possible than in the authorization to employ
the general principles of law in arriving at its decisions. The only qualification
made by Article 38 is that the Court must use only those principles of law
which are "recognized by civilized nations." 22
21. Judge Altamira pointed out this aspect of the judicial process when he wrote in the
Lotus case that often in this process
there are moments in time in which the rule implicitly discernible has not as yet taken
shape in the eyes of the world, but which is so forcibly suggested by precedent that it
would be rendering good service to the cause of justice and law to assist its appearance
in the form in which it will have all ihe force rightly belonging to rules of positive law.
Case of the Steamship "Lotus," Permanent Court of International Justice, series A, No. 10
(1927) (dissenting opinion).
22. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 38, supra note 19. Since it is chiefly civilized nations
which have achieved the stage of articulated principles of law, there is nothing particularly
restrictive about this provision of the Statute. Cf. treatment in LAUTERPACHT, op. Cit.
supra note 17, at 165. It does, however, raise difficulties in the modern world which has
seen the inclusion of nations of various levels of development into the community of na-
tions. It is sometimes the case that the principles of law prevailing among the majority of
civilized nations is invoked even though one of the parties to a dispute may not have heard
of it. Lord Asquith highlighted this issue in the Arbitration Between Petroleum Develop-
meat (Trucial -Coast), Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu .Dhabi (1951), reprinted in 1 THF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAw QUARTERLY 247, at 250-51. (1952):
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Some jurists suppose that these general principles are to be drawn from
some ideal view of obligation; others hold that it is the actual principles in use
in living systems of law to which reference is here made, such as that promises
should be kept, or res judicata. The full force of this provision is to reject the
notion that only statute law is law. At the same time, this does not mean that
the judge is hereby set free to develop his principles of law; these principles are
drawn from the fund of juristic wisdom which represents the fusion of long
practical experience and intellectual reflection. 2 3
In a decision rendered -by a tribunal which was set up by an agreement be-
tween the United States and Great Britain, the status of general principles was
referred to in this manner:
[E]ven assuming that there was . . . no specific rule of international law
formulated as the expression of a universally recognised rule governing the
case .. . it can not be said that there is no principle of international law
applicable. International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and
generally does not contain, express rules decisive of particular cases; but the
function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing rights and
interests by applying, in default of any specific provision of law, the corol-
laries of general principles, and so to find ... the solution of the problem.
This is the method of jurisprudence; it is the method by which the law
has been gradually evolved in every country resulting in the definition and
settlement of legal relations as well between States as between private in-
dividuals.2 4
When we look back upon the activities of the Court, we find that only in
a very narrow sense can it be said that international law is "what the court does."
If any single and distinctive contribution of the Court emerges from this analysis,
it is that besides applying the settled law, the Court is the channel and the instru-
ment by which morals (not the morals of the judges but of the community)
enter the law.
This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be performed in that country.
If any municipal system were applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi.
But no such law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh administers a purely
discretionary justice with the assistance of the Koran; and it would be fanciful to
suggest that in this very primitive region there is any settled body of legal principles
applicable to the construction of modern commercial instruments.
The arbitrator, relying on the terms of the contract, also ruled out any other system of
municipal law as proper law and found that the contract prescribed the "application of
the principles rooted in the good sense and common practice of the generality of civilized
nations - a sort of 'modem law of nature.'" Id. at 251.
23. Early writers on international law were in the habit of drawing on the Roman law;
such a practice continues and is justified on the ground that principles which are found to
be generally accepted by civilized legal systems can well be assumed to be so reasonable
that they can be relied upon to maintain justice in any system. And it is inevitable that
the Court should find it necessary to turn to such general principles in the course of its
work; otherwise, it would have to say, in those controversies where there is no specific
statute or "law," that the issue "is riot clear," that there is no way of resolving the case.
24. Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph Co. (Great Britain v. United
States), Americ&n and British Claims Arbitration, NIELSEN'S REPORT "73, 75 quoted in
J. L. BaumLy, TH, LAw Op NATIONS 67-68 (5th ed.,' 1955).
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III. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE NATURE OF LAW
The entities we call nations have deep historical roots and are intimately
related to the social, economic, and even psychological security of individuals.
Hence, such entities have developed an extraordinary sense of individualism and
independence. This individualism expresses itself in a peculiarly forceful way
through the notion of sovereignty, for it is in the name of sovereignty that na-
tions resist the application of such rules as are traditionally called international
law. Why should the doctrine of sovereignty have such a destructive effect up-
on the rule of law among nations? There can be no simple answer to such a
difficult question, but to a considerable extent this outcome is the consequence
of the conceptual apparatus which supports the doctrine of sovereignty.
The modern theory of sovereignty is largely the product of the imaginative
philosophy of Hobbes. Whenever one asks why states are sovereign, invariably
some of the mythology of Hobbes is given in the answer: Savage individual
men, to secure their survival, irrevocably surrender their right of self-determina-
tion to the sovereign. The sovereign is absolute, as his power is absolute. Just
as individuals lived in a state of "war of all against all," so nations are in a
"perpetual posture of war." Each sovereign state -has a right to do whatever
is necessary to its survival.25
During the nineteenth century and to a great extent even today, this picture
drawn by Hobbes has been the prevailing view of the sovereign state. If we
look behind the doctrine of sovereignty we find nothing more profound than this
fundamentally egotistical view of man and nations. The self-interest of individuals
and of nations is raised to the rank of the law of nature. To take the doctrine
of sovereignty either literally or strictly is to destroy the possibility of an inter-
national law.
There have been, however, attempts to derive a basis for international law
without rejecting the doctrine of sovereignty, and this approach is to be found
particularly in the theory of consent. The premise of this theory is that there is
nothing necessarily contradictory between the existence of sovereign states and
international law, since the latter is the product of the consent of nations. This
means that there is no reason why a sovereign nation cannot limit itself througb
an agreement with another nation.26
Undoubtedly, it is entirely consistent to say that a sovereign can consent to
be bound. States do not, however, expressly consent to all the rules by which
they find themselves bound when they become states. When a new state is
formed, it becomes bound by many rules which it did not create and even with
which it may not have been expressly familiar. It is, of course, possible to argue
25. Kings, and Persons of Sovereign authority, because of their Independency, are in con-
tinual jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weaponspointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns
upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continual Spys upon their neighbors;
which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their
Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty
of particular men. . . . HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. 13.
26. GEoao JELLINEK, ALLOEMEINE REcHTSLEHRE (1905). Cf. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY 417 (3rd ed., 1053).
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via a legal fiction that each state "tacitly" consents to the prevailing rules of
conduct to which membership in an international community binds it, but this
notion of a tacit consent is clearly only an attempt to repair a defect in the
consensual theory.27
A far more important objection to the consensual theory of limitation is that
it does not achieve an adequate basis for international law because it does not
explain how or why a state should be bound by a rule of international law. Can
a self-imposed limitation be a true limitation? For example, if a nation agrees
to be bound by its promise, can it really be bound if the only reason for obli-
gation is consent to be bound? Cannot a sovereign "take back" its consent?
The theory of consent does not account adequately for the binding nature of
agreements; behind any particular promise is the fundamental rule that promises
ought to be kept, and this rule is not the product of anybody's consent. Although
it would appear that individuals limit themselves in their behavior when they
observe the moral law, what is of paramount importance 'here is that individuals
do not create the moral law. The moral law has an unconditional and impera-
tive quality and is addressed to an individual who senses an obligation to it;
he believes in the objective existence of the rule and wills to conform to a rule
he did not create.28
There is an additional objection to the consensual theory: the doctrine of
sovereignty and consent turn to a fictional entity for an explanation of obligation,
namely, the state. Of course, the law frequently deals with fictions, such as the
corporation. But the state or nation does not possess the attributes of personality;
and therefore it is almost impossible to derive from the doctrine of the state
the foundations of the rule of law, for law in its clearest sense is a matter of
reason and is addressed to rational and conscious beings.
The doctrine of sovereignty is too abstract to stand by itself; it needs the
kind of support which the concept of law requires, namely, the personal entity.
With the rise of the sovereign state, however, the personality of the state was
raised above that of its members and given a life of its own. For international
law this meant that the subjects of international law were not human beings
but states. Even if an individual was injured by another state, his government
was the subject of the controversy - he could neither have access to any tribunal
for restitution nor even receive damages if they were paid.2 9
27. Criticisms of the Austinian concept of sovereignty similar to this and what is con-
tained in the following paragraph are made by H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
215-21 (1961).
28. This is substantially the same argument used at the Nuremberg trials when Robert
Jackson argued that even if there were no specific positive consent on the part of nations
to be bound by certain rules of behavior, to indulge in such acts as genocide and torture
is clearly a violation of rules to which nations are obligated to conform. Cf. Sheldon
Glueck, The Nurenberg Trial and Aggressive War, 59 HARvARD LAW REVIEW 396 (1946).
29. QUINCY WRIGHT, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1955). "Sovereignty was
omnipotent - the state could treat its nationals unjustly or even barbarously; it could
deny them fair trials'or execute them without a trial; it could permit discrimination, starva-
tion, or massacre and violate no rule of international law." (Id. at 19)
What made it possible up to our day for such acts as these to be immune from the
rule of law is the preponderant view that it is not sufficient that an act be morally iniquitous
in order to make it contrary to law. Even more disastr6us was Hobbes's view that where
there is no law there is no morality, for law and morality are born together. Thus, in a
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But today the state is increasingly regarded as the agency for the protection
of actual persons. The movement toward this latter view in recent years is a
recognition of the fictional character of the state as a person and an expansion
of the conviction that concrete persons are the subjects of international law.
Persons become the subjects of international law chiefly because it is from human
values and relations that the law takes its shape. The shift from the notion
that a state exists for itself to the newer view that it is the agent for human
beings was affected by a series of events which in our day is most dramatically
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document was
the culmination of earlier attempts to put human beings instead of states into
the role of subjects of the law.3 0 There were several treaties which set forth
the rights of aborigines, of minorities, of workers, of women, of children and
of other classes of persons who were in danger of oppression. 3 1 The United
Nations Charter represents a major move to put individuals in the forefront
as subjects of the law, and this means not only a recognition of human rights
but also its corollary, namely, personal responsibilities. The Charter calls for
"international cooperation . .. in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."3 2 This trend of separating.the fictional state from the
concrete person was reflected in the trial and sentencing of the leaders of the
aggressive nations after the Second World War. If individuals have rights, then
it is individuals too who are accountable for the violation of those rights.
The development of international law has thus required the gradual modi-
fication of the theory of sovereignty, for such a doctrine does not fit the facts
of the nature of law. The law emerges from the consciousness of living persons
and is addressed to concrete persons; its function and purpose is to order the
state of nature in the international scene, it was assumed that each nation could do what-
ever it wished to its own citizens, and the assumption was that there could not be even a
moral criticism of such acts, for by definition such a moral criticism would invoke a principle
of conduct superior to the will of the sovereign. But such a limitation of sovereignty would
destroy the essence of sovereignty. Even during the Nuremberg trials one line of defense
taken by some of the Nazi officials was that the "crimes" for which they were being tried
were not crimes at all because there had been no specific law designating their acts as
crimes; in addition, these officials said they acted on behalf of and in the name of their
sovereign state and were therefore accountable to no one else. (Glueck, op. cit. supra note
28, at 436).
30. Cf. BIN CHENO, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953):
The theory of abuse of rights (abus de droit), recognised in principle .. .by the Per-
manent Court of International Justice ... is merely an application of this principle [the
principle of good faith which governs international relations] to the exercise of
rights .... [p. 121] The exercise of a right -. or supposed right, since the right no
longer exists - for the sole purpose of causing injury to another is thus prohibited.
Every right is the legal protection of a legitimate interest. An alleged exercise of
that right not in furtherance of such interest, but with the malicious purpose of
injuring others can no longer claim the protection of the law. (p. 122)
This is, in effect, a specific limitation on external sovereignty.
31. WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 29, at "21.
32. U. N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3'
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conduct of rational beings. To say that law emanates from the will of a state
is to misconceive the nature and the true source of law. Both historically and
analytically it appears to be incorrect to account for the emergence of law in
terms only of the command of a sovereign. 33 The facts of recent history point
to an element at work rather different from the will of sovereign states. This
is the rational and ethical postulate of a community of interests and functions
and values. A far more creative principle in the formation and development of
international law is the postulate of moral dbligation; this obligation is grounded
not in the physical force of sovereigns but in the common concerns of the human
beings who make up the international community. Thus, the "first cause" in
international law is not so much the will of individual states as it is the rational
and moral rules which the emerging international community is finding in-
creasingly new opportunities to express. 34
To ground the international law upon the moral consensus of the world
community is both a slow and ambiguous process. The law must take concrete
and precise form and must be reducible, if not to a code, then at least to a
working set of principles. The law must provide its instrument of adjudication,
the Court, with the guides for decisions. Ultimately the rule of law must mean
the settlement of controversies on the basis of clear rules by the competent ju-
dicial organ. This is, of course, the very point at which legal theorists confront
their most difficult task, for they seek a precise source of law. This is the reason
they look to the sovereign, which is such a definite entity, and turn away from
the more ambiguous realm of "moral consensus," which is almost incapable of
exact identification or delineation. This is the reason, too, for identifying law
with what the courts do, for, in the last analysis, the decision of the court repre-
sents the law in the realistic sense of the term. Nor can we deny that the inner
logic of the economic order affects the legal order. But what our analysis has
shown is that, granted the legitimate relevance of economics, court, and sovereign,
the idea of law flows through all these toward the level of morality from which
it cannot be conceptually separated.
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33. Cf. Stumpf, Austin's Theory of the Separation of Law and Morals, 14 VANDERBILT
LAw RzvIEw 117 (1960).
34. Cf. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
420-23 (1933). Lauterpacht argues that "undoubtedly the effectiveness of the law de-
pends to a large extent upon the prevalent practice and the general level of morality, but
the very fact of the reign of law is, and tends to become increasingly, part of common
practice and morality." Id. at 437.
A former judge of the International Court of Justice, Charles De Visscher, in a signif-
icant and penetrating book made substantially the same point when he wrote that "in the
international order as in the internal order, the human values are the final reason for the
rule of law. Founded upon the moral conceptions which are the essence of civilization, they
impose themselves upon the State whose mission is to assure their protection and their
free development." DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET RALIT*S EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 211 (1953).
